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The conscription debate: should Australia re-introduce national service?




Echo Issue Outline 1999 / 41: copyright © Echo Education Services
First published in The Echo news digest and newspaper sources index.
Issue outline by J M McInerney

What they said ...
'We would always be willing to consider the introduction of national service if the national military and defence need of Australia required it'
Prime Minister John Howard

"I would rule it (conscription) out in these circumstances - I just don't think it's appropriate'
Admiral Chris Barrie, chief of Australian Defence Forces

On September 24, 1999, the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr John Howard, indicated that his government would be prepared to re-introduce conscription for military service, should this become necessary.
The comment was made in the context of Australia having recently sent a substantial peacekeeping force to East Timor.
Though the Prime Minister only raised the possibility of re-introducing conscription in very general terms, his reference to the issue met with an immediate reaction.
A number of media commentators indicated why they thought such a measure would be inappropriate. On September 26, the chief of Australian Defence Forces, Admiral Chris Barrie, indicated why he 'would rule ... [conscription] out in these circumstances'.

Background
Australia has a total defence force personnel of some 50,000 soldiers, sailors and pilots. It claims a standing army of 23,200, a regular air force personnel of 13,250 and a regular navy personnel of 13, 550. Australia also has some 30,695 reserves. 26, 850 of these personnel are army reserves.
It has been claimed, however, that these figures give an exaggerated impression of Australia's military preparedness in terms of actual fighting forces.
It is generally claimed that for every thousand military personnel Australia places in the field a further two thousand need to be in readiness either to replace them on rotation or to support and maintain them.
It is therefore claimed that Australia would only be able to place a force of between 3,000 and 6,000 in an operation such as that in East Timor and that its capacity to sustain that number of forces would be limited to between three and six months.
Analysts have noted that Australia's current military manpower situation is largely attributable to the policy of successive Australian governments of upgrade military equipment and reducing the number of military personnel. It has been claimed that this has been the result of a view that Australia would either need to act in defence of its territory from a regional attack or, if it were operating overseas, would be acting in concert with powerful allies, most probably the United States.
The East Timor crisis appears to have forced Australia to reconsider it place within the region, the strength of its major alliances and the likelihood of it receiving significant support from the United States.
It is currently being suggested that Australia may have underestimated the degree of threat that could be anticipated from within our region and have overestimated the likelihood of military support, in terms of troops on the ground, that we could expect from our major allies.
The upshot of this is that Australia is currently discussing the need to increase the level of government spending on the defence forces and is also looking at ways of increasing our number of military personnel.
It is in this context that the question of national service has arisen.

There is a limited number of Internet sites which deal with aspects of this issue.
The Defence Public Affairs Organisation (DPAO) has a copy of a media release from the Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie.
The release is dated 28 September, 1999, and is titled Defence Chief Reiterates Conscript Remarks.
In this release Admiral Barrie explains that remarks of his made on the Sunday program and subsequently reported in the print media were not intended as a general condemnation of national service personnel. Rather, the release indicates, the admiral does not believe that conscripts are appropriate in Australia's current circumstances and in a 'modern high technology defence force'.
The admiral's media release can be found at http://www.dod.gov.au/media/1999/29699.html

On 15 October 1996, the Minister for Defence The Hon. Ian McLachlan, AO, MP established the DER (Defence Efficiency Review).
A series of fact sheets summarising the recommendations of the DER can be found at http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/der/facts.htm
This is a substantial collection of documents, however, as an indication of defence department and government thinking on Australia's defence requirements up to 1996, it is very interesting.
Of particular interest are fact sheets Nos 18 & 19 dealing with Resources Saving and Employment Implications.

Finally, Research and Analysis, the newsletter of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, has an interesting article giving an overview of Australia's defence policy up to the time of publication.
The article is titled Strategic Guidance: Emerging Themes and Tensions and was written by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Norris and Major Darren Kerr, both with the Strategy and Concepts Section of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis.
It was published in issue No 14 of Research and Analysis, dated May, 1997.
The article can be found at http://www.defence.gov.au/dara/issue14.htm#DefPol
This article foreshadows an apparent shift in Australia's defence policy from one focused narrowly on DOA (Defence of Australia) to 'a more expansive concept of regional security engagement'. This is particularly in the light of Australia's current role in East Timor.
Especially of interest is the judgement 'ADF will need to consider the appropriate size of the land force commitment which could be sustained and still remain relevant and influential. Recent European experience has demonstrated that a brigade-sized force is the minimum necessary to achieve military influence. Given the reduction of the Army full-time force to 20 000 by the year 2000, this poses a significant challenge.'
The article appears to suggest that there is an inherent contradiction between a more ambitious foreign policy posture and government-inspired attempts to reduce military expenditure and manpower.

Arguments favouring the re-introduction of national service
The first argument offered in support of the re-introduction of national service is that it would only be considered if strictly necessary.
According to this line of argument, if the defence of Australia or the pursuit of its legitimate foreign policy objectives required the use of conscripted forces than any federal government would have no choice but to establish and deploy such forces.
This point has been made by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr John Howard.
Mr Howard has claimed, 'We would always be willing to consider the introduction of national service if the national military and defence need of Australia required it'
It has further been argued that the current crisis in East Timor may require the re-introduction of national service.
According to this line of argument, Australia will not be able to maintain its current peacekeeping force in East Timor if its tour of duty extends beyond 12 months. There are also those who have argued that Australia would not be able to maintain and relieve our current forces in East Timor if they remain in place for no more than six months.
It has further been argued that the demand on our forces could not be meet if there were another emergency which required a military response while so many of our forces were already committed. It has also been suggested that plans to use the defence forces for security purposes during the 2000 Olympic Games might not be feasible given Australia's current level of engagement in East Timor.
Critics of the present situation have compared it with what was necessary to sustain Australia's military involvement in Vietnam.
Michael O'Connor, the executive director of the Australia Defence Association, has stated, 'During the Vietnam War, the Australian Army needed about three brigades to support the deployment of one. To achieve that level of commitment, conscription was introduced and almost three years passed before the army was able to sustain its operations.'
It has also been argued that drawing on the general reserves would not remove the need for conscription.
Two reasons have been given for this.
Firstly it has been claimed that in the event of an extended engagement in East Timor or elsewhere Australia's reserve numbers are insufficient to rotate our regular service personnel.
Secondly, it has been claimed that the current provisions determining how reservists can be released for active service mean that they could not readily be called upon.
This point has also been made by Michael O'Connor.
Michael O'Connor has claimed that during the Vietnam War, 'Despite the availability of larger reserves than are currently in place, the government was reluctant ... to use the reserves instead of resorting to conscription.'
Michael O'Connor has argued that the principal reason why governments are reluctant to use general reservists is 'the lack of adequate legal provision for the protection of the soldiers' civilian jobs as well as their employers' interests.'
According to this line of argument a government cannot deploy its reserve forces when the members of those forces are likely to lose their jobs while serving overseas. Such a demand on reservists would be unethical and would also be politically damaging.
Michael O'Connor has noted that despite the efforts of Australia's defence forces no progress has been made toward having governments guarantee the jobs of reservists called into active service.
In defence of conscription, it has also been noted that any return to national service would not target the unemployed.
There have been suggestions by some within the Government that the work for the dole scheme be extended to include military service.
However, Government sources have been reported as claiming that any such involvement by the unemployed 'would be strictly voluntary'.
The government appears to be concerned to remove any suggestion that the unemployed would be required to put their lives at risk as the price for continuing to receive unemployment benefits.
Those who are not opposed to conscription have also argued that the criticisms made of the quality of national service personnel are unjust.
This point has been made by Mr Jim Wares, a former Vietnam veteran, now living in Queensland.
Mr Wares has claimed, 'The fact is, the conscripts we sent to Vietnam were very highly trained. They were quality soldiers.'
It has further been argued that a re-introduction of conscription would not automatically be socially divisive.
It has been suggested that if there were there sufficient support within the Australian community for a particular military engagement or peacekeeping mission, then Australians might be prepared to accept the re-introduction of conscription.
This point has been made by Dr Jim Cairns, deputy leader and treasurer within the Whitlam Labor Government. Dr Cairns was also a prominent campaigner against both Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War and the use of conscripts in that war.
Dr Cairns has noted, 'If the majority feel that sending troops to East Timor is justified they might accept ... [conscription].'

Arguments against the re-introduction of national service
One of the main arguments offered against the re-introduction of national service is that a conscript makes a less effective, because less committed, service person.
This point has been made by George Abel, who, in the 1950s, was a regular in the Royal Air Force, serving alongside national servicemen.
Mr Abel has claimed, 'Most of my national service comrades fulfilled their duties well enough - but only just. There was no deep commitment to the service, only looking forward to the day of release.'
It has further been suggested that the skill levels required by service personnel in a modern technologically advanced defence force would not be achieved through national service.
This point has been made by Admiral Chris Barrie, the chief of Australian Defence Forces.
Admiral Barrie has claimed that Australia has a world-class military force and that 'you don't get that with a conscription force'.
It has also been claimed that serving alongside conscripts damages the morale of the regular service person.
This point has also been made by George Abel who has claimed, 'I found the " nasho" working and living alongside the regular was dispiriting to the latter and did not make for good morale.'
It has further been suggested that the only viable long-term solution to the manpower problem of the Australian armed forces is to improve the pay, status and conditions of service people so that the services become a more attractive career option.
George Abel has claimed, 'The object of the Government must be to enhance the status of the services ... Only then will more recruits be forthcoming.'
There are those who are concerned that a recourse to national service may allow the Government to avoid improving the pay, status and conditions of service personnel and so preclude the boost to the standing of the services that is needed to encourage greater numbers of recruits.
It has further been argued that national service is not an appropriate means of supplying further education for or instilling discipline in young people.
According to this line of argument the purpose of the armed forces is to defend the country and promote its foreign policy objectives. No other function, it has been claimed, should be allowed to stand in the way of the armed forces' principal role.'
George Abel has asked, 'Why ... should the armed services be correctional institutions for the perceived shortcomings of young people?'
It has further been argued that rather than contemplating a possible re-introduction of national service, the Government should be looking to more creative and positive ways to increase Australia's defence force capability.
One such method, which has been promoted by some, was the Ready Reserve scheme.
The Ready Reserve scheme began in 1992. Under the scheme young people could volunteer for one year's full-time training followed by 50 days training a year over the next four years. The first year's training was exactly the same as that received by regular recruits. The four years' additional training was twice that received by general reservists.
Under the scheme financial support to employers was available which meant that Ready Reservists could be immediately withdrawn from their place of employment and still have their positions waiting for them when they returned.
A brigade of Ready Reservists cost about 63 per cent of a regular formation, which, it has been claimed, made it relatively expensive. However, its supporters have noted that it produced a high calibre service person who could be readily deployed when necessary.
This point has been made by Associate Professor Hugh Smith, from the Australian Defence Force Academy, who has noted of the Ready Reserve scheme, 'it ... provided a highly trained, young and keen group of solders ideally suited to relieving full-timers on a peacekeeping mission.'
The Howard federal Government has been criticised for ending the Ready Reserve scheme in 1996 when it was first elected to office.
Opposition Defence spokesperson, Mr Stephen Martin, has claimed, 'If we still had the Ready Reserve we would have 2500 well trained soldiers in place and ready to go.'
It has further been claimed that if Australia were to re-introduce conscription, this would be socially divisive and might well undermine support within Australia for whatever military engagement conscripts were to be used in.
This point has been made by The Age in its editorial of September 29, 1999.
The Age editorial states, 'The most divisive issue in Australia since Federation has been conscription for overseas service. Twice during World War One, referendums on the question were narrowly defeated after tumultuous campaigns. The aftermath was bitter sectarian division.
In the mid-1960s the nation divided over the coalition's Government's decision to send troops to support the US intervention in Vietnam, a division exacerbated by the reintroduction of conscription for overseas service.'
There is also a strong civil liberties argument against conscription, especially for overseas service.
The underlying argument appears to be that it is unethical to force Australian citizens to put their lives at risk in a military engagement, especially where this engagement is off-shore and is not the result of Australia being attacked.

Further implications
The Government has called an inquiry into the suitability of the Australian army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war. The inquiry is not due to hold its fist hearing until November 26.
The recommendations of this inquiry will be interesting to note.
Also of interest is the fact that defence force recruiting is about to go out for private tender. This initiative will not have been in operation for long enough to be assessed within the army inquiry. However, it is now certain, that should the privatisation of defence force recruitment procedures prove a failure there will be marked pressure for an improved system.
It has been reported that in advance of the tender process and the privatisation of recruitment that will follow it, the army is already increasing its recruitment efforts. Immediate need appears to have over-ridden previous government policy directions.
The Government has also called for the production of a defence white paper. Though this process was in train prior to recent developments in East Timor, the East Timor situation will obviously have a major impact on the recommendations that will be made.
It seems all but certain that the Government will substantially increase its defence budget.
On the specific question of conscription, such a policy would only be implemented if absolutely necessary. Though it has been predicted that a peacekeeping presence will be required in East Timor for some years, Australia anticipates that the United Nations will send its peacekeepers to the island within six months. This would free Australia from having to carry the major financial and manpower burden of the peacekeeping operation.
So long as Australia is able to reduce its involvement in East Timor within six months it seems unlikely that conscription would be re-introduced. Should developments occur which either keep Australian forces committed in East Timor for a longer period, or require Australian forces to be deployed elsewhere while we continue to maintain a substantial presence in East Timor, then it is possible that conscription could be re-introduced.

Sources
The Age
15/9/99 page 18 editorial, 'Time to think again on defence'
15/9/99 page 18 letter from Graham Middleton, 'Our Army is hopelessly under strength'
18/9/99 Page 2 (News Extra) analysis by Paul Daley, 'Why the Defence Force will never be the same'
23/9/99 page 10 news item by Brendan Nicholson, 'Peace army seeks recruits'
25/9/99 page 1 news item by Tony Wright & Lindsay Murdoch, 'PM raises conscription option'
25/9/99 page 6 analysis by David Elias, 'Conscription a policy that has torn the nation'
29/9/99 page 14 editorial, 'One step forward, two steps back'
2/10/99 page 1 news item by Tony Wright, 'Army "on a shoestring"'
2/10/99 page 8 (News Extra) letter from George Abel, 'Why national service is not the answer'

The Australian
14/9/99 page 13 analysis by Sid Marris, 'Defence dilemma'
14/9/99 page 15 comment by Michael O'Connor, 'Pared-down military barks, but can it bite?'23/9/99 page 13 comment by Hugh Smith, 'Strength sapped by low reserves'
16/9/99 page 11 comment by Robert Garran, 'Policy-makers trail in wake of new world order'
27/9/99 page 2 news item by Richard McGregor & Robert Garran, 'Admiral sinks call for call-up'
2/10/99 page 11 comment by Bob Lowry, 'Time will tell on army's manpower'

The Herald Sun
23/9/99 page 3 news item by Ian McPhedran, 'The dole brigade'
26/9/99 page 13 news item by Ian Haberfield & Matthew Horan, 'Calls grow for call-up plan'