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Echo Issue Outline (... appearing in 1999 print editions 37 - 38

TITLE: Australia and East Timor: has Australia's handling of the East Timor situation been appropriate?


Copyright © Echo Education Services
First published in The Echo news digest and newspaper sources index.

Issue outline by J M McInerney

In September, 1999, some 3,000 Australian troops were sent to East Timor as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force. A further 1,500 have been pledged.
This follows the August referendum in East Timor resulting in a massive vote for independence from Indonesia which has forcibly occupied the eastern half of the island since 1975.
East Timor has remained a major point of contention in Australian foreign affairs since it was occupied by Indonesia in 1975. What is sometimes referred to as Australia's 'special relationship' with Indonesia has been claimed to have been built on a failure to oppose the annexation of East Timor.
In the current crisis the Australian Government has been criticised for fostering the East Timor referendum and then being reluctant or unable to take the action needed to defend those who voted.

Background
Timor is about 450 kilometres north west of Australia, across the Timor Sea or Timor Gap.
Timor is an island of the Malay Archipelago.
The total area of Timor is 32,350 sq km. East Timor occupies an estimated area of almost 19,000 km, and comprises the eastern half of the island.

1500s The Portuguese arrived on the island and settled in the eastern half. Later, the Dutch colonized the western side. Throughout the following centuries the territory remained in a state of constant rebellion.

1942 East Timor was part of what the Allies regarded as a buffer zone against the Japanese during World War II. Australian and Dutch forces landed in East Timor, despite Portugal's neutrality. The Japanese Imperial Army occupied the island some three months later executing some 50,000 East Timorese. The East Timorese harboured Australian troops fighting Japanese forces on the island.

1945 After World War II the Republic of Indonesia was created according to the borders it had inherited from the period when the archipelago was a Dutch colony. East Timor was a Portugese colony and Indonesian authorities did not claim it as part of the new state.

1974 April 25 The Revolution of the Carnations in Portugal resulted in the fall of the dictatorship then ruling Portugal. The new Portuguese government recognised the right of all remaining Portuguese colonies to self-determination. It began the decolonisation process in East Timor.

1974 September 6 Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, met President Suharto in Wonosobo, a resort town in Central Java, and agreed that the eventual integration of East Timor into the Indonesian Republic was inevitable.

1975 July 1 Portugal set October 1976 as the date for popular elections for a General Assembly to determine East Timor's future. Portuguese colonial control was set to end in October 1978.

1975 August There was fighting in East Timor between Indonesian sponsored forces and Fretilin, the pro-independence forces. Fretilin gained control of all of East Timor.

1975 October 6 Indonesian troops attack Batugade, a border town in East Timor.

1975 December 7 East Timor was invaded by the Indonesian army.

1975 December 12 The United Nations General Assembly condemned the Indonesian invasion. (This was the first of a number of UN condemnations of Indonesia's take-over of East Timor which has never been recognised by the United Nations)

1976 July 17 Indonesia claimed annexation of East Timor as its 27th province.

1978 The Fraser Coaltition Government recognised Indonesia sovereignty in East Timor.

1985 August 18 Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, announced Australian recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor on behalf of his Labor Government.

1985 October 27 The Indonesian and Australian governments begin discussions for a joint petroleum exploration program in the Timor Gap, south of Timor.

1989 December Australia and Indonesia sign Timor Gap Treaty.

1995 Australia and Indonesia signed a joint security agreement

1997 November Australia and Indonesia struck a deal to share the proceeds of the $10 billion Bayu-Udan gas project in the Timor Gap, operated by Australian company BHP.

1998 May Indonesia's President Suharto resigned. His deputy BJ Habibie took over as caretaker President. Indonesia has suffered severely under the so-called 'Asian economic meltdown' and is under pressure to reform both its economy and political structure.

1999 Indonesian President Habibie agreed to a plebiscite in East Timor. The East Timorese were to choose between autonomy, while remaining part of Indonesia, and full independence.

1999 August More than 70 per cent of East Timorese voted for full independence.

1999 September Thousands of East Timorese appear to have been killed and others forcibly relocated in West Timor by pro-Indonesian militia. It is claimed that the Indonesian military supported the militia.

1999 September After some weeks and much destruction and apparent loss of life President Habibie agreed to a United Nations peacekeeping force coming into East Timor. The force is being lead by Australia.


There is a large number of Internet sites which supply valuable information on the background to the current East Timor crisis.

The most comprehensive source of information on East Timor and Australia appears to be available through the Pacific Talk Virtual Library.
The Virtual Library is a project of the Pactok network. Pactok is an electronic mail network designed to serve the Asia-Pacific region. Pacific Talk is supported by The University of Technology, Sydney.

A good place to start within the Pacific Talk Virtual Library is with its collection of documents on Australian Government Policy on East Timor. The index for this collection can be found at
http://www.pactok.net/docs/et/ausg.html
It includes a detailed chronology of Australia's positions on East Timor since 1975. It also includes a detailed analysis of the approach adopted toward Indonesia and East Timor by the Whitlam Government up to the take-over.

Of particular interest is the Pacific Talk Virtual Library's collection of documents on Australia's recent policy changes with regard to East Timor. The index for this can be found at http://www.pactok.net/docs/et/ausg990112.html
It includes a media release from the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, dated January 12, 1999, detailing Australia's position regarding East Timorese self-determination. It also gives the position of the federal Opposition on the Government's announcement as well as documents indicating the attitude of Portugal, the United States and Indonesia.

A more recent speech of Alexander Downer's dated March 1, 1999, and titled Looking Ahead to Help East Timor can be found at http://www.pactok.net/docs/et/ausgfm990310.html

An interesting analysis of Australia's current and past positions on East Timor has been produced by Professor James Cotton, head of the School of Politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales.
The article is titled Australia's Interest in East Timor and was originally published in The Strait Times, March 3, 1999. It can be found at http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/timor.html

On September 28, 1999, the BBC produced a special report on East Timor titled The trials of East Timor. This is a wide ranging series of articles with a valuable set of links. It includes an analysis of Australia's changed position in the region.
It can be found at THIS ADDRESS

The BBC has also produced a report on the East Timor situation titled Timor and the end of empire. It gives a clear, detailed account of East Timor's history of occupation. It can be found at THIS ADDRESS
The report is dated September 21, 1999.

On September 20, 1999, the BBC produced a report titled Who makes up the Timor force? This gives a detailed breakdown of the contributions made by the various nations making up the UN peacekeeping force.
The report can be found at THIS ADDRESS

There are a number of organisations which have lobbied for East Timorese independence since its annexation. One of these is the East Timorese International Support Centre (ETISC).
The ETISC is based in Darwin. It claims to be fully autonomous and is an incorporated non-profit company. It was established in 1996.
The East Timorese International Support Centre produces a publication titled Timor Today. This can be found at http://www.easttimor.com/
This site gives news updates, a detailed history of the development of the conflict, ethnic and cultural information about the East Timorese and a significant amount of comment and analysis.

The Indonesian Government's Department of Foreign has supplied a detailed treatment of the history of Indonesia's involvement with East Timor from an Indonesian perspective.
This background views the annexation as a necessary response to Portuguese neglect. It argues that there was no wholesale killing in East Timor by Indonesian forces and that the traditions and religious practices of the East Timorese have been respected.
The treatment can be found at http://www.deplu.go.id/policy/view/timor/background.htm


Arguments in favour of Australia's handling of the East Timor situation
Defenders of Australia's response to the East Timor situation argue that we have taken a reasonable and responsible approach to the developing crisis.
To those who argue that Australia should have sent in troops immediately the situation began to deteriorate after the independence vote defenders counter that this was not feasible
A number of reasons have been given as to why Australia could not simply have sent in troops.
It has been argued that if we had gone in independently, without being part of a United Nations peacekeeping force, many Australian soldiers would have been killed. We would, it has been claimed, only have been able to have sent a maximum of 4,500 soldiers and they would have been confronted by some 14,000 Indonesian troops.
It has also been argued that if we had sent troops without Indonesia's consent, Indonesia would have regarded this as an act of war.
Andrew Bolt, a commentator for The Herald Sun, has argued that if Australia had acted unilaterally (without Indonesian consent and without being part of a United Nations contingent), then Indonesia would have retaliated by denying 'us vital shipping and air routes and [forming] strong hostile regional alliances.'
It has also been noted that Australia had to wait for Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping force, because, without Indonesian consent no other country was prepared to join such a force.
This point has been made by Paul Kelly, The Australian's international editor.
Mr Kelly has noted, '... no country was prepared to contribute without Indonesian agreement. No country was prepared to go to was with Indonesia over East Timor.'
It has also been argued that a strong, unsanctioned Western response, from either Australia or the United States, would have undermined Indonesia's movement toward democracy.
Indonesia's national assembly is soon to chose a new president. There has been concern expressed that any action which could be seen as a foreign attack could push Indonesia toward military dictatorship.
This point has also been made by Andrew Bolt who has claimed, ' ... the United States has resisted the idea of peacekeepers, fearing they could weaken the credibility of civilian rule [within Indonesia].'
It has further been argued that the actions Australia has taken have proved successful to this point.
From this point of view it has been argued that Indonesia has now agreed to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force and that that force is being headed by Australia which has contributed the largest number of troops.
Greg Hunt, senior adviser to the Australian Foreign Minister from 1996 to 1998, has praised the actions of the Howard Government in this regard.
Mr Hunt has claimed, 'The [Australian] Government placed our relationship with Indonesia on the line in demanding that international troops be allowed in. It was right to do so and it was effective to do so.'
Mr Hunt has also praised the Australian Government for the role it played in helping to ensure a strong United Nations' response in support of East Timor.
Mr Hunt has claimed, 'Australia told the UN that it accepted responsibility for leadership of an international force. The trade-off was that the UN must be uncompromising with Indonesia.'
A similar point has been made by Herald Sun commentator, Lynne Holroyd.
Lynne Holroyd has claimed, 'Our government has committed significant troops to a peacekeeping force and demanded similar action from other nations.
Our government's leadership and strong lobbying has inspired other nations to act.'
Defenders of Australia's handling of the current crisis have also argued that we were not acting inappropriately in our encouragement of the autonomy or independence plebiscite.
Firstly it has been noted that Australia had initially urged a much more gradual transition toward East Timorese independence.
The decision to offer the East Timorese a more dramatic choice - autonomy within Indonesia or full independence - was taken by Indonesia's President Habibie.
Secondly, it has been claimed that it would have been inappropriate to have attempted to halt the referendum when it was obviously strongly desired by the East Timorese.
Thirdly, it has been claimed that it was in all probability beyond Australia's diplomatic endeavours to influence the form in which the Indonesian Government decided to cast the referendum.
Fourthly, it has been argued that it is only with hindsight that the extent of the danger the plebiscite represented for East Timor can be seen.
This point has been made by Dr Harold Crouch, senior fellow in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University.
Dr Crouch has argued, '... critics now claim that Australia's support for the "fatally flawed" referendum in East Timor contributed to the present situation.
But I don't recall their voices in August demanding that the referendum should be cancelled ...'
Finally, with regard to claims that successive Australian governments have, since 1975, been too ready to develop a 'special relationship' with Indonesia, defenders of this policy argue that there were valid reasons for it.
It has been noted that a cooperative relationship with Indonesia was seen as important for Australia's regional security. Indonesia was also seen as a valuable trading partner.
It has also been claimed that Australia was concerned to promote regional stability by supporting Indonesia in its movement toward democracy, greater economic security and greater social equality.
These points have been made by Gareth Evans, who was foreign minister in both the Hawke and Keating administrations.
Gareth Evans has claimed that Australia was `Helping the fourth biggest country in the world, and the biggest Islam country, manage its own social, economic and political transformations.'
With particular regard to the fate of East Timor, Gareth Evans has argued that Australia was literally unable, in 1975, to prevent Indonesia's take-over of East Timor.
Gareth Evans has claimed, 'Australia was in no position militarily to stop or reverse Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975'.
The Australian's international editor, Paul Kelly, has noted that in 1975 no other country was prepared to go to war with Indonesia in defence of East Timor, had Australia tried to take any military it would have been acting alone.
Gareth Evans has pointed out that immediately after the Vietnam War 'the international mood of the time was absolutely against another Asian imbroglio.'
Gareth Evans has argued that Indonesia was well aware that other nations would not be willing to come to East Timor's defence and so any diplomatic attempts made be Australia to have East Timor allowed to become independent would have been futile.
Gareth Evans further notes that the Australian Prime Minister in 1975, Gough Whitlam 'was firm and unambiguous throughout in opposing Indonesian military action'.
It has also been claimed by Gareth Evans that when the subsequent Fraser Government, and later Labor governments, recognised Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor they did so with the proviso that they saw East Timor as 'a non-self-governing territory entitled to self-determination'.

Arguments against Australia's handling of the East Timor situation
Critics of Australia's handling of the East Timor situation tend to fall into one of two camps. There are those who argue that Australia has done too little to assist the East Timorese and there are others who argue that since December, 1998, we have promised to do too much.
The first set of critics argue that since 1975, for strategic and trade purposes, Australia has adopted a policy of accommodating Indonesia and that this was done at the expense of the East Timorese.
Age commentator Robert Manne, who is associate professor of Politics at Monash University, has paraphrased the position of those who believe that Australia should have done more over the past 25 years to assist East Timor and less to maintain a special relationship with Indonesia.
Professor Manne has claimed that these critics '... thought Australia's regional policy should be devoted to support for democracy, human rights and the principle of self-determination.'
According to this line of argument, Australia has allowed considerations of trade and regional security to override its concern for principles such as respect for human rights and national sovereignty.
Critics argue that Australia should not have accepted Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in 1975 after the Portuguese withdrew.
It is claimed that the take-over should have been opposed because it was against the wishes of the majority of East Timorese and has only been maintained by the use of the Indonesian military.
Successive Australian governments have also been criticised because they not only failed to oppose the annexation of East Timor, but actually gave formal recognition to the Indonesian take-over.
Critics have noted that most other nations did not recognise the legitimacy of Indonesia's forcible integration of East Timor.
They have also noted that the take-over was not recognised by the United Nations.
Further it has been claimed that Australia's long-term failure to support East Timor is specially inappropriate as, it is argued, we have a particular obligation to the East Timorese because of the support they offered us in World War II. East Timor harboured Australian troops during World War II.
These criticisms of Australia's supposed accommodation policy toward Indonesia have been summed up by Ian McPhedran, the Herald Sun's defence reporter.
Mr McPhedran has written, 'For decades, successive [Australian] governments have turned a blind eye to the atrocities of Indonesia's military in the name of the "broader" relationship'.
It has been claimed that Australian governments have either ignored the extent of the military's influence in Indonesia politics or they have badly misjudged the situation
A similar position has been summarised by Ray Cassin, writing for The Sunday Age.
Mr Cassin has maintained that the pro-Indonesian lobby, which, he argues, has shaped Australian foreign policy for the last 24 years, has always adopted the view 'Indonesia matters. East Timor doesn't.'
The Age in its editorial of September 18, 1999, summed up opposition to this policy of appeasement.
The editorial concluded, '... if friendship [with Indonesia] can be maintained only by keeping silent on massive human rights abuses, it is scarcely worth having.'
There have also been criticisms of successive Australian governments for having supplied military aid to Indonesia as such aid was in part used against Indonesian citizens.
It has been claimed that Australian 'defence cooperation' with Indonesia between 1988 and 1999 cost Australia in excess of $36 million.
Jim Aubrey, a spokesperson for Australians for a Free East Timor, has claimed , 'These programs have acted to subsidise the capacity of Indonesia's armed forces to oppress the people of Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya, as well as ordinary Indonesians.'
Critics of Australia's treatment of East Timor argue that our policy of accommodating the Indonesians has continued right up to the current crisis in East Timor.
It has been claimed that the same tendency to placate Indonesia resulted in Australia not calling for a peacekeeping force to be installed either before or immediately after the independence vote to prevent punitive action by the pro-Indonesian militia.
Australia has also been criticised for not seeking United States diplomatic support earlier, before the vote had been taken and the violence had erupted.
This position has been put by Hugh MacKay, an author and social researcher.
Mr MacKay has claimed, '... we did know that violence was likely: the Foreign Minister said so, months ago. So why weren't we entreating other countries - especially the United States - to join us in voicing our concern to Jakarta, long before the outbreak of terror.'
Some critics of Australia's handling of the situation claim that Australian intelligence reports had indicated well prior to the plebiscite that if the people of East Timor voted for independence they would be punished by the Indonesian military or the militia.
From this point of view, it is argued, we did not take the risks to the East Timorese sufficiently seriously and did not make sufficient effort to minimise those risks.
Finally, among those who argue that Australia has done too little to support the East Timorese, there are those who claim that when the killing began after the vote for independence was known, Australia should have sent in troops immediately to protect the East Timorese.
The second set of critics of our handling of the East Timor situation are those who argue that we have over-reached ourselves in the promises of support we made East Timor immediately before and after the plebiscite.
This point has been made by Frank Devine, writing for The Australian.
Mr Devine claimed that the promises of support we had given East Timor were excessive because they were not within our power to deliver.
Mr Devine has argued three points: that Australia had to wait for the Indonesians to accept a peacekeeping force; that we were never in a position to rely on the military support of the United States as part of such a force and finally, that even once we entered East Timor, the results of our intervention would be uncertain.
Mr Devine concluded from this, 'By now it is unarguably clear that we have let the East Timorese down, because it was never in our power to keep any promises of succour.'
Mr Devine has further noted, 'Maybe East Timor has persuaded us to quit big-noting in Asia and to talk softly without deluding ourselves or others about carrying a big stick.'
A similar point has been made by Mr Bill Hayden, who was Australian foreign affairs minister from 1983 to 1987.
Mr Hayden has claimed that the role we have recently played in promoting the plebiscite in East Timor and then in pledging to support the East Timorese has shown an exaggerated view of our capacity to act.
Referring to the killings which occurred after the East Timorese voted for independence, Mr Hayden commented, 'This slaughter of the innocents of East Timor by forces of evil over which we have no influence - none at all - is a cruel policy outcome for us.
We need to get our perception of the role we play in the world down to realistic proportions. And we need to be far less noisy about it than we have hitherto been.'

Further implications
The implications of this most recent development regarding East Timor are profound.
Australia's role in the crisis appears to mark a significantly more assertive response to regional affairs than has come to be expected over the last 20 to 25 years.
Australia's relationship with Indonesia has obviously been damaged, though the development of the crisis has left many commentators wondering how real Australia's special relationship with Indonesia has ever been.
Though Indonesia has ended its mutual defence pact with Australia, Australian mining interests in Indonesia have been guaranteed. There is also no current prospect of trade embargoes between Australia and Indonesia. Australia's trade with Indonesia is worth more than a billion dollars annually, and it is in Indonesia's favour.
Many commentators have been concerned to stress that both the Australian Government and the Australian people need to make a distinction between the Indonesian people and the actions of the Indonesian military.
There is concern that an aggressive and anti-Indonesian stance by Australia not strengthen the hand of the Indonesian military and impede Indonesia's progress toward democracy.
These developments are also believed to have significant implications for Australian defence policy in the future.
It has been argued that we have not sufficiently maintained our defence forces and so are in an inadequate state of preparedness. It has also been claimed that we have previously placed too great a reliance on the United States' probable support and the strength of our relations with our immediate neighbours.
The down side of this new awareness of our more vulnerable position may be that we actually foment conflict by an insular, if not hostile, posture within our region.
There is also concern that we not style ourselves as the policeman of our region, a role which would be resented and which it is claimed we are ill-equipped to carry out.
Finally, the immediate implications for the East Timorese remain dire. The peacekeeping force has no authority to go into West Timor, where many East Timorese appear to have been relocated.
It remains to be seen how successful the peacekeeping force will prove in maintaining order in East Timor.
The militia's destruction of towns and crops has left East Timor facing the prospect of severe shortage, if not famine.
Further, no peacekeeping force will be able to restore the lives of those East Timorese already killed by the militia.
There are those who maintain that the strength of the East Timorese vote for independence, and the negative international reaction to the killing which followed should ultimately ensure that East Timor gains its independence.
Should this happen this opens up the prospect of other Indonesian provinces, notable Irian Jaya, seeking independence.
For Australia there also remains the possibility that some of its defence personnel will be killed in the peacekeeping mission. Further, if the peacekeeping mission extends beyond six months, Australia currently does not have the capacity to relieve its forces.
It seems likely that there will be a dramatic rethinking of our defence spending and recruitment practices.

Sources
The Age
13/9/99 page 15 comment by Jim Aubery, 'Counting the costs of a not so special relationship'
14/9/99 page 15 comment by Greg Hunt, 'Why Howard deserves much credit'
15/9/99 page 19 comment by Harold Crouch, 'Why Indonesia still deserves a fair go'
16/9/99 page 19 comment by Michael Gordon, '"No regrets" Mr Howard? Really?'
18/9/99 page 8 editorial, 'A relationship under stress'
18/9/99 page 9 comment by Hugh MacKay, 'A tragedy in the timing'
19/9/99 page 24 comment by Ray Cassin, 'The Jakarta cheer squad takes a pique at reality bites'
22/9/99 page 12 news item by Paul Daley, 'Both parties to blame: Howard'
22/9/99 page 18 comment by Gerard Henderson, 'Our muddled message'
23/9/99 page 16 editorial, 'Time to find our place in the world'
24/9/99 page 15 comment by John McCarthy, 'Memo to Indoneasi: we are not your opponent'
25/9/99 page 9 comment by Harold Crouch, 'Get it right, we're not the leader in South-East Asia'
27/9/99 page 19 comment by Robert Manne, 'A nation all alone'

The Australian
9/9/99 page 11 comment by Frank Devine, 'Escaping hot air leaves Downer deflated'
14/9/99 page 15 comment by Bill Hayden, 'Don't forget we're on our own'
15/9/99 page 13 comment by Paul Kelly, 'From the lips of prime ministers'
16/9/99 page 7 comment by Greg Sheridan, 'A holocaust of Canberra's making'
17/9/99 page 1 news item by Dennis Shanahan, 'US fury at our "failings"'
21/9/99 page 3 news item by Richard McGregor and Megan Saunders, 'Brereton queries optimism'
21/9/99 page 15 comment by Frank Campbell, 'Beyond the colonial cringe dwellers'
24/9/99 page 15 comment by Greg Sheridan, 'Puppet without a master spells disaster'
25/9/99 page 18 editorial, 'East Timor's agony had many sources'
27/9/99 page 12 comment by Gareth Evans, 'Steps beyond ending bloodshed'

The Herald Sun
7/9/99 page 16 letters from Jean Jenkins and John Nicholson, 'Timorese need Australia's help now'
9/9/99 page 18 comment by Andrew Bolt, 'Five reasons for not rushing into a war in East Timor'
9/9/99 page 19 comment by Ian McPhedran, 'How could we get it so wrong?'
13/9/99 page 18 comment by Andrew Bolt, 'East Timor's pain is not our shame'
14/9/99 page 16 letters from Allen Harris and Muhir Abdulhai, 'Australia reaps what it sowed in Timor'
15/9/99 page 18 comment by Lynne Holroyd, 'Tough stance helps Timor'
17/9/99 page 4 comment by Ian McPhedran, 'End of pact is a nasty signal'
19/9/99 page 20 comment by Magnus Clarke, 'A move we may regret'
21/9/99 page 7 comment by John Hamilton, 'We owe them this one'
22/9/99 page 12 news item by Andrew Cummins, 'Policy in a mess'