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'We are living in unique times of unique evil, at war with an enemy of unspeakable brutality, and I have no doubt that now, more than ever, the principle is right despite the chance, tragically, of error' Lord Stevens, the former Met police chief who brought in the policy of aiming for the head when dealing with suspected suicide bombers
'I understand they need to combat crime but they should not combat crime with crime. They should not be exterminating people unjustly which is what happened to my cousin Jean.' Vivien Figueiredo, 22, a cousin of Jean Charles de Menezes
The issue at a glance
On July 22, 2005, a 27-year-old Brazilian immigrant, Jean Charles de Menezes was killed by British police who had mistaken him for a suicide bomber.
Initially it was claimed there was significant circumstantial evidence to justify this mistaken belief. Later, a leaked internal report suggested this was not the case.
The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes has lead to significant debate over what terrorist response measures are appropriate. However, the London Police have indicated that they will not be altering their aim-for-the-head policy when dealing with suspected suicide bombers. The risk to the general public, they claim, is too great to adopt a more conservative policy.
The controversy surrounding the shooting of Mr de Menezes has continued with the Brazilian Government expressing its concern over the incident. Various civil liberties groups and groups representing ethnic minorities have suggested current policies will result in the deaths of other innocent people wrongly suspected of being terrorists.
Background
The day after the shooting, the Metropolitan Police identified the victim as Jean Charles de Menezes, and acknowledged he had no connection with the attempted bombings of July 21st. An apology described the incident as 'a tragedy, and one that the Metropolitan Police Service regrets.'
The Brazilian government released a statement expressing its shock at the killing and seeking a full explantion of the circumstances surrounding it.
The Muslim Council of Britain expressed immediate concern about the apparent existence of a 'shoot to kill' policy and called on police to make clear their reasons for shooting the man dead.
The reaction of the British public to the shooting was mixed. Many sympathised with the need for the police officer in question to make a split-second decision, others condemned the killings as either police incompetence or the consequences of a faulted policy. Various British groups staged protests over the shooting. The reaction of the Brazilian public was overwhelmingly negative.
It was announced that there would be an internal investigation of the incident by officers from Scotland Yard's Directorate of Professional Standards and that it would be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), as is the case with all fatal police shootings.
On 16 August 2005 British broadcast network ITV released a report alleged to be based on leaked documents from the IPCC investigation. The report revealed a version of events which contradicted previous statements by Police Chief Sir Ian Blair. An anonymous 'senior police source' claimed that the leak was accurate. The person responsible for the leak, a secretarial worker at the IPCC, was suspended.
On 18 August 2005 the IPCC issued a statement alleging that the 'Metropolitan Police Service initially resisted us taking on the investigation'. They also announced that the inquiry was expected to last between three and six months.
The shooting prompted widespread discussion of the rules of engagement followed by armed police when dealing with suspected suicide bombers. Roy Ramm, a former commander of specialist operations for the Metropolitan Police, said that the rules had been changed to permit officers to 'shoot to kill' potential suicide bombers, under the logic that a head shot is the only way to disable the bomber without risking detonation of their explosives.
How the Metroplotian Police might best counter a suicuide bomber has been extensively discussed within the force since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. New guidelines were developed for identifying, confronting, and dealing forcefully wih terrorist suspects. These guidelines were given the code name 'Operation Kratos'. The full details of these giuidlines have not been made public.
On September 7, 2005, Salon.com published an analysis by Andrew Brown titled, 'Is it OK to shoot a suspected terrorist in the head?' This is a wide-ranging discussion of the particular circumstances of Mr de Menezes' shooting and of the issues raised by the aim-for-the-head policy.
The article can be found at http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/09/07/british_police/
Salon Magazine usually requires non-subscribers to view a brief advertisement before reading its articles.
On July 24 2005 the BBC published a report by Chris Summers titled 'The police marksman's dilemma'. The report details the various regulations determining when police are able to use their firearms. It also gives a brief history of a number of police shootings the legitimacy of which has been contested.
The article can be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4711619.stm
Arguments justifying the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes
1. There had been a series of suicide bomb attacks on London three weeks before the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes
On Thursday 7 July 2005 a series of four bomb attacks struck London's public transport system during the morning rush hour. At 8.50 a.m, three bombs exploded within 50 seconds of each other on three London Underground trains. A fourth bomb exploded on a bus at 9.47 a.m. in Tavistock Square. The bombings led to a severe, day-long disruption of the city's transport and mobile telecommunications infrastructure.
Fifty-six people were killed in the attacks, including the four suspected bombers, and 700 people were injured. The incident was the deadliest single act of terrorism in the United Kingdom since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (which killed 270), and the deadliest bombing in London since the Second World War.
The bombings were reported as suicide bombings. The bombers' capacity to cause great damage and loss of life has been claimed by many supporters of extreme police action to justify the use of measures such as a shoot-for-the-head policy among British police. It has been claimed that such a policy is justified by the threat to human life that suicide bombers represent.
2. A second terrorist attack had been attempted in London the day before the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes
The need to operate on an emergency footing and to take measures which could effectively protect London's citizens was further demonstrated on July 21 2005 when a second bombing attack was attempted on England's capital.
Four attempted bomb attacks disrupted part of London's public transport system two weeks after the 7 July 2005 London bombings. The explosions occurred around midday at Shepherd's Bush, Warren Street and Oval stations on London Underground, and on a bus in Bethnal Green. It has been reported that a fifth bomber dumped his device without attempting to set it off.
Connecting lines and stations were closed and evacuated. Metropolitan Police later said the intention was to cause large-scale loss of life, but only the detonators of the bombs exploded, probably causing the popping sounds reported by witnesses, and no one was injured. The bombers escaped; subsequent arrests the same day were later described by police as 'totally unconnected' with the explosions.
Jean Paul de Menezes was shot the following day.
London police chief Sir Ian Blair has said, 'I hope [the Menezes family] understand the police were trying to do their very best under very difficult circumstances.'
The head of the London police has stressed that his officers were responding to a situation of immediate threat, their sense of which had been strengthened by the previous day's events.
Sir Ian Blair elaborated, 'It [the shooting of Jean Paul de Menezes] wasn't just a random event and what's most important to recognise is that it's still happening out there ... The important thing is there's nothing gratuitous going on, there is nothing cavalier here, there is no conspiracy to shoot people.'
3. Orders had been issued that suspected suicide bombers were to be shot in the head.
Since the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, British Police have taken advice from officers in countries such as Israel and Sri Lanka which have long experience of suicide attacks.
The advice the British Police have received is that if a suspect clearly has no intention of surrendering, the armed officer should attempt to aim for the head or lower limbs to prevent a suicide belt being detonated.
Under a policy instituted in 2001 by the association of police chiefs, members of the Met's elite SO19 firearms unit were permitted, to shoot dead, if necessary without warning, anyone whom they suspected to be a suicide bomber. The total Met force of 31,000 has only about 2,000 officers allowed to carry firearms (with 440 of these being part of SO19 and given further training as specialists).
After the July 7th bombings, the SO19 firearms unit was instructed to launch 'Operation Kratos' - the codename for the secret guidelines which told officers how to react to suicide bombers. During the Kratos briefings, the Met team were told that, contrary to their normal arms training, they should fire at the head rather than the chest.
A former Home Office adviser, Dr Sally Lievesley, has pointed out that suicide bombers represent a nightmare scenario for the police. 'A suicide bomber can kill four or five times more people than a conventional bomb because they can get so close to their targets, so different precautions and tactics are needed.'
London police chief Sir Ian Blair has said, 'There is no point in shooting at someone's chest because that is where the bomb is likely to be. There is no point in shooting anywhere else if they fall down and detonate it.'
4. Jean Charles de Menezes was observed coming from a block of flats where it was believed one of the unsuccessful bombers from the day before lived
The apartment building where de Menezes lived had been under joint police-military surveillance since early on the morning of the day he was shot, after forensic investigators found a gym card with that street address on it. It was believed the address, a building containing several apartments, was the home of one of the suspected attackers - Hamdi Isaac aka Hussein Osman, whom it was believed had tried to detonate a bomb on a subway train at Shepherd's Bush the day before.
Officers followed Menezes for five minutes as he walked to the Tulse Hill bus-stop for the Number 2 bus line. As he boarded the bus, several plainclothes police officers boarded, continuing the pursuit. At some point for an unknown reason, during the 10-25 minute ride to the Stockwell Tube station, Menezes briefly got off the bus, waited for a few moments and boarded it again. Finally the bus arrived at Stockwell Tube station, 3.3km (2 miles) away, with de Menezes still being directly followed and observed by the London Police.
The fact that de Menezes had come from a block of flats where the police had reason to believe that one of the terrorist suspects from the day before lived was a key factor in their decision to follow him and in a subsequent order being given that he was not to be allowed to board a train.
5. Jean Charles de Menezes was of ethnic appearance and was believed to resemble at least one of the suspected bombers
Though pale complexioned, Jean Paul de Menezes, a Brazilian citizen, was not Caucasian. As a Brazilian, de Menezes fell into the category the London Police refer to as "white ethnic". Mr de Menezes' appearance seems to have been such that a number of people who saw him on the morning he was shot were struck by his foreign appearance. One witness to the shooting of Mr de Menezes said the man who had been shot had an 'Asian appearance'. Initial media reports said that Mr de Menezes was Middle Eastern in appearance.
Mr de Menezes appearance may well have meant that he had a greater likelihood of being mistaken for one of the terror suspects.
Unfortunately for Mr de Menezes the officer charged with photographing and confirming the identification of any potential suspect who left the apartment building was going to the toilet when Mr de Menezes emerged and did not film him.
As a result, no reliable visual identification was made; the officer reported that a male of the appropriate age had left the building but advised that it would be worth someone else having a look to obtain a positive identification.
At some point during the journey from the apartment building to the Stockwell Tube station, the officers pursuing Mr de Menezes contacted Gold Command, and reported that Mr de Menezes potentially matched the description of two of the previous day's suspects, including Osman Hussain. Based on this information, Gold Command authorized 'code red' tactics, and ordered the surveillance officers to prevent Mr de Menezes from boarding a train.
'Code red' tactics involve the use of the Force Firearms Unit (better known by its Specialist Operations designation SO19). This is the department of the London Metropolitan Police which provides firearms-related support to the generally unarmed force.
6. Jean Charles de Menezes was unseasonably dressed
It was claimed that Mr de Menezes was dressed in a manner that aroused suspicion. Initially it was reported that he had been wearing a heavy padded jacket which it was suspected may have been worn to hide a bomb.
Photographs taken after Mr de Menezes was shot reveal that he was wearing a denim jacket. There are those who have maintained that this jacket also was unseasonable and thus may have aroused the suspicions of the police. At the time of the shooting, the temperature in London was about 17 øC.
7. Mr de Menezes behaved in a way which aroused police suspicions
Initially it was claimed that before Mr de Menezes was shot he had been hailed by the police and had ignored this call. It was also claimed that he had run from them onto the platform, hurdling a turnstile as he went. Subsequently, CCTV footage revealed that Mr de Menezes had not been hailed on the platform and had descended the escalator slowly, only running when the train actually pulled into the station. However, given that the police had been ordered not to allow Mr de Menezes to board a train the officer who shot him in the carriage presumably believed the action necessary to prevent passengers being put at further risk.
Further, during the bus ride from the Tulse Hill bus-stop to the Stockwell Tube station, Menezes briefly got off the bus, waited for a few moments and boarded it again. During the trip, Mr de Menezes also used his mobile phone. It was later discovered that he had rung to say that he would be late for work. The police may well have feared that he was contacting or attempting to contact a co-conspirator.
Arguments challenging the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes
1. There had been no conclusive identification of Jean Charles de Menezes as a suspected bomber
Whatever the police's suspicions, there had been no definite identification of Mr de Menezes as one of the possible terrorists before he was shot. The officer charged with photographing possible suspects leaving the Scotia Road apartment building was relieving himself when Mr de Menezes came onto the street and was unable to turn on a video camera to send images to Gold Command (the Metropolitan Police operational headquarters for major incidents).
This officer passed on the message that Mr de Menezes 'would be worth someone else having a look'. On the basis of this officer's suspicion, Gold Command authorised officers to continue pursuit and surveillance.
The officers pursuing Mr de Menezes contacted Gold Command, and reported that Mr de Menezes potentially matched the description of two of the previous day's suspects, including Osman Hussain. On what basis this judgement was made remains unclear. Mr de Menezes bore little resemblance to Osmain Hussain, who was much darker skinned. The original surveillance officer had described Mr de Menezes as IC1, which is police jargon for light-coloured skin; yet Hussain was IC3 - dark-coloured. It is difficult to imagine how any surveillance officer equipped with a photograph of Mr Hussain could have mistaken him for Mr de Menezes.
Despite this the identification was made and Gold Command authorised 'code red' tactics, which meant the Force Firearms Unit was called in.
When Mr de Menezes boarded the train at the Stockwell Tube station one of the armed officers who followed him onto the train shot him as a suicide bomber, still without a properly confirmed identification.
Critics have suggested that appearing 'ethnic' gave the London Police all the justification it needed to shot a man dead.
2. The claims made about Charles de Menezes' suspicious behaviour were untrue
The various claims made about Mr de Menezes' supposedly suspicious behaviour appear to have been untrue. It was claimed that Mr de Menezes was hailed by the police and failed to respond. It now appears he was never hailed.
It was also claimed that Mr de Menezes ran into the station, pursued by the police, hurdled a turnstile and then ran on to the train. However, CCTV footage from the station shows these claims to be untrue. The footage apparently shows that Mr de Menezes entered the Tube station at about 10:00 a.m and stopped to pick up a free Metro newspaper. He used his transit card to pay the fare and walked through the barriers, and descended the escalator slowly. This behaviour would appear to indicate that Mr de Menezes was unaware that he was being followed.
Mr de Menezes only ran across the platform when the train pulled into the station and after boarding the train sat in one of the first available seats. Critics claim that none of this behaviour is consistent with that of someone who was attempting to evade capture. It has further been suggested that the official statements issued immediately after Mr de Menezes' death were a deliberate misrepresentation of the truth. It has been suggested that the police were attempting to justify their actions.
The other claim made about Mr de Menezes that has been shown to be untrue is that he was wearing a heavy padded jacket under which a bomb could have been concealed. Some reports after the shooting even suggested that Mr de Menezes had wires visible about his person. Photographs taken after Mr de Menezes was shot show him to have been wearing a denim jacket over a t-shirt. It would not have been possible for him to have hidden a bomb beneath this clothing.
Critics of the police operation have argued it was at best a fearful over-reaction conducted with apparent disregard for the appearance and behaviour of the supposed suspect they were observing.
3. Jean Charles de Menezes should not have been allowed to board public transport
It has also been suggested that the surveillance of Jean Charles de Menezes was mishandled because the officers involved did not do as they had been directed and prevent Mr de Menezes from boarding the train.
In an article published in The Socialist Worker On-Line of August 26th 2005 it was claimed, 'Assuming that de Menezes was a match for a terrorism suspect, British officers were instructed to not allow him to board a train. But instead of arresting the unarmed man during the more than 30 minutes that they followed him that morning, police waited for the arrival of a special armed police unit - trained in a shoot-to-kill technique perfected in Israel, that includes firing multiple rounds into a potential suspect's head.'
4. Jean Charles de Menezes had been restrained when he was shot
It has been noted that Mr de Menezes had his arms pinned to his body by a plain clothes surveillance officer when he was seized by SO19 officers and shot seven times in the head and once in the shoulder.
The officer who restrained Mr de Menezes has stated, 'I grabbed the male in the denim jacket by wrapping both my arms around his torso pinning his arms to his
side. I then pushed him back onto the seat where he had previously been
sitting with right-hand side of my head pressed against the right-hand
side of his torso.
At this stage his body seemed straight and he was not in a natural sitting position. I then heard a gunshot very close to my ear and was dragged away onto the floor of the carriage. I shouted 'police' and held up my hands. I was then dragged out of the
carriage by an armed officer who appeared to be carrying a long-barrelled weapon. I heard several gunshots as I was being dragged out of the carriage.'
It has been claimed that if Mr de Menezes had been a suicide bomber he would either have detonated his bomb at this point or, the manner in which he was being held, prevented him from doing so. The fact that there had been no detonation should have suggested that Mr de Menezes was not a threat.
5. There was no effective co-ordination between the different branches of the police
According to a 'senior police source', the officer in charge of Gold Command, Commander Cressida Dick, gave clear and specific orders that Mr de Menezes was to be 'taken alive'. This order would appear to have either not been relayed to the SO19 officer who shot Mr de Menezes, or to have been disregarded by him.
According to police sources, members of the surveillance team who followed de Menezes into the station believed he was not a threat but the firearms officers who arrived later took a different view.
The plain clothes surveillance officer who restrained Mr de Menezes before and while he was shot appeared to have been surprised by the shooting. He is reported to have said, 'I ... pushed him back onto the seat where he had previously been sitting with right-hand side of my head pressed against the right-hand side of his torso.
At this stage his body seemed straight and he was not in a natural sitting position. I then heard a gunshot very close to my ear and was dragged away onto the floor of the carriage. I shouted "police" and held up my hands. I was then dragged out of the carriage by an armed officer who appeared to be carrying a long-barrelled weapon. I heard several gunshots as I was being dragged out of the carriage.'
6. Any aim-for-the-head policy is effectively 'shoot-to-kill'
Under the Kratos policy, in suicide bombing cases, officers are advised to use force not only when the threat of someone's death is imminent but when they have a 'reasonable basis to believe that the suspect has the capability to detonate a bomb'. And when they need to shoot, officers should aim 'at the bomber's head'. Shooting for the head, though apparently intended primarily to prevent a possible suicide bomber from detonating a bomb, has the probable consequence of killing the suspect.
Critics of this policy have noted that it represents a 'shot-to-kill' policy based on mere suspicion. The scope for error, they argue, is significant. The death of Jean Charles de Menezes is seen as a dreadful illustration of this risk.
7. Extreme preventative measures are an infringement of fundamental liberties
There are those who claim that taking extreme action against an individual because it is feared he or she may commit an offence violates that person's rights as punishment is given in advance of guilt having been established.
Arie Freiberg, the dean of the law faculty at Monash University, has recently made this claim in relation to the Australia's response to terrorists and asylum seekers. 'The state of fear that has been created in relation to terrorists, sex offenders, asylum seekers and other generally "undesirable people" should not allow the gradual erosion of those laws and values that lie at the heart of our legal system.
If we uncritically accept the metaphors of war and the need for emergency powers, there will be few limits to the growth of the preventive state, where what matters is not what you have done, but what the government suspects that you might do. That is not a secure foundation for a just and safe society.'
Critics of the Jean Charles de Menezes' shooting claim it represents the end point of preventative action. A man was killed not because of what he had done but because of what he might do and those fears were subsequently shown to be baseless.
There had been no due process to establish his guilt yet he was effectively executed. Our legal system has traditionally operated on an assumption of innocence. Shoot-to-kill policies undermine these traditions and threaten the rights and the lives of innocent citizens.
Further implications
The new procedural guidelines that allow a police officer to aim for the head of a suspected suicide bomber without challenging or warning have an obvious practical utility. When bombers have explosives strapped to their chests, a disabling shot to the torso is not a viable option. It can detonate volatile explosives or it can leave the bomber alive and capable of detonating them himself. Tasers can also set off the bomb. Similarly, hailing the suspect may simply give him time to detonate an explosive device. Under these circumstances a shot to the head has been proposed as the only viable option..
However, as the London tragedy shows, accurately identifying a suicide bomber with split-second timing is difficult and shoot-to-kill mistakes are irreversible. Under these circumstances it is imperative that there by rigorous procedures in place to ensure that this shoot-to-kill policy is only implemented when officers have solid grounds for suspecting they are dealing with a suicide bomber. As Andrew Brown, writing for Salon Magazine noted, 'The assumption on which the policy rests is that the police's suspicions will always be justified; and at moments of crisis, this is what everyone wants to believe.' However, as the de Menezes case demonstrates only too clearly such assumptions can be awry.
In the case of Jean Charles de Menezes it would appear that no adequate grounds for suspecting him of being a terrorist existed. No conclusive identification was ever made to confirm that he was one of the suspected bombers from July 21st 2005. He was shot because he emerged from a building in which it was believed one of the suspects lived. As there were nine apartments in that building, coming out of it was hardly proof of anything. It must also be asked, if the Metropolitan Police regarded him as a risk why was he ever allowed to board a train. Mr de Menezes was under observation for some thirty minutes before he boarded the train.
There will, unfortunately, always remain the possibility that an innocent bystander will be mistaken for a terrorist and fatally wounded by police. However, operational procedures should be such as to reduce the likelihood of this happening. In the case of Mr de Menezes, his death appears to have been an avoidable tragedy.
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